By
Conn Hallinan
“Democracy is like a tram; you get off
when you have reached your destination.” The comment by Recep Tayyip
Erdogan—made more than 20 years ago when he was first elected mayor of
Istanbul—sums up the Machiavellian cynicism of Turkey’s authoritarian
president. As Turkey gears up for municipal elections March 31, it is a
prophecy Erdogan has more than fulfilled: the prisons filled with the
opposition, the media largely silenced, the courts intimidated, the bureaucracy
tamed, and more than 150,000 people fired.
But for all that, there are dark
clouds on the horizon, much of them largely of the President’s own making. And
since it is traditional for the Turkish electorate to use local elections to
send a message, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) may be in
for a setback.
For one thing, the AKP’s bread and
butter issue, the economy, is in trouble and may be in very serious trouble.
Industrial production has fallen 6 percent and retail sales 7 percent, and
overall growth has dropped from 7.4 percent in 2017 to a projected 2 percent in
2019. Inflation is at 20.3 percent and unemployment is accelerating. The most
recent figures show that more than 11 percent are out of work, with almost
twice that for young people age 15 to 24, who constitute some 20 percent of
Turkey’s population.
In the past “terrorism” was the major
concern for voters, but recent polls indicate that the economy is the number
one issue, followed by unemployment and Syrian refugees.
Erdogan constructed his election
juggernaut on economic growth that lifted a considerable section of the
population out of poverty and fueled a major growth of the middle class. Much
of that economy was centered on the construction industry and mega-projects
like shopping malls, bridges and the largest airport in the world.
For Erdogan an economy built around
massive projects was a win-win formula: the AKP handed out lucrative contracts
to big construction firms, which, in turn, filled the electoral coffers of a
party that went from the margins of the political spectrum to at one point
winning almost 50 percent of the electorate.
But growth fell to an anemic 1.6
percent in the third quarter of last year, and the construction industry is in
a recession, with large layoffs almost certain. The crisis of the building
trades has had a domino effect on allied industries in cement, steel, and
ceramics. And the combination of the lira’s fall in value, coupled with the
economic insecurity people are feeling, has depressed sales in the automotive
industry, electronics, and appliances,
The Turkish economy has long been
reliant on foreign capital—so-called “hot money”— to keep the factories humming
and living standards rising. But hot money is drying up and the bills are
coming due. Since much of Turkey’s debt is in foreign currency, it is harder to
pay off those debts with a depressed lira. Ankara has opened talks with the
International Monetary Fund to explore a bailout, but IMF bailouts come with a
price tag: austerity, not exactly a winning electoral program.
While much of Erdogan’s political
opposition has been jailed or sidelined, it has not been cowed. In spite of
nine parliamentary deputies from the Kurdish-based left-wing People’s
Democratic Party (HDP) being imprisoned, that party still managed to get enough
votes in the last election to hold their spot as the third largest party in the
parliament. A hunger strike by imprisoned Kurdish activists has also generated
sympathy for the HDP, and for the first time in Turkish history many of the
Kurdish parties have formed a united front.
The HDP has also decided not to run
candidates for the mayoralties of the big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, in
order to help elect candidates from the secular center-right Republican
People’s Party (CHP). In short, anyone but the AKP.
The AKP used to get a substantial
number of Kurdish votes, particularly from conservative rural areas. But when
Erdogan launched a crackdown on the Kurds in an effort to marginalize the HDP,
he lost many of those voters. While not all of them have migrated to the left party,
they have shifted their votes to other Kurdish parties, now united under the
Kurdistani Election Alliance.
Besides domestic woes, Erdogan’s
foreign policy is hardly a major success. The Turkish occupation of northern
Syria has failed to scatter the Kurdish-based Syrian Democratic Forces, and it
looks increasingly like Ankara has stumbled into a quagmire. Erdogan’s plan was
to drive the Kurds out and re-populate the area with Syrian refugees. Instead,
he is in a standoff with the Russians and the Americans, and, to protect
themselves, the Kurds appear to be cutting a deal with the government of Bashar
al-Assad.
There is a strong streak of
nationalism among the Turks, and Erdogan may yet harvest it by pressing the
Kurds in Turkey’s southeast, Iraq and Syria. But the Turkish army is
overextended and still reeling from the purge of officers and rank and file
that followed the failed 2016 coup. And there are credible reports that the
military is not overly happy with occupying part of Syria.
The Turkish President did score points
in his battle with Saudi Arabia over the kingdom’s murder of the journalist
Jamal Khashoggi, as well as with his support for Kuwait and Qatar in their
dispute with the United Arab Emirates and the Saudis. His willingness to resist
US sanctions against Iran is also popular because it means trade and a lift for
Turkey’s ailing economy.
However, the March vote is not likely
to turn on foreign policy, but rather on pocketbook issues like unemployment
and the wobbling economy. Erdogan is doing his best to head off any unrest over
the economy by handing out low-interest loans and giveaways, like paying
electrical bills for economically stressed families.
The opposition also claims that the
AKP alliance is stuffing the rolls with non-existent voters. HDP investigators
found that one house in Hakkari in the Kurdish southeast has 1,108 registered
voters.
But Turkish agriculture is a mess, and
construction and manufacturing are staggering under an enormous debt load.
Erdogan has used the power of the state to hobble his opposition, but the state
of emergency is alienating foreign investors and many Turks are increasingly
weary of it.
In the 2017 referendum that bestowed
almost unlimited executive powers on Erdogan, he lost Istanbul, Ankara and
Izmir, Turkey’s largest cities. A recent poll showed support for the AKP had
dropped from 42.5 percent the Party got in the 2018 election to 35 percent
today.
After 17 years of power, after using
every device he could—including stuffing ballot boxes—to build a powerful
executive system orbiting around him, it is hard to imagine Erdogan suffering a
setback. But tossing people in prison and intimidating opposition has had
little effect on repairing the economy or raising living standards. And many
Turks may be souring on the “destination” that Erdogan has brought them to, and
they could well decide to send that message on March 31. (IPA Service)
Courtesy:
People’s World
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