By
Sanjiv Krishan Sood
My heart goes out to the families of
all the CRPF personnel who lost their lives in one of the most audacious attack
by militants on security forces. The suicide attack which occurred on February
14 in Pulwama in South Kashmir killed more than 40 CRPF troops. It also marks a
shift in the militant tactics.
Shrill calls for retribution from
self-proclaimed defence experts, sundry panelists and the anchors are drowning
sane voices. Usual “unka balidan vyarth nahi jayega” or “iska hisab chukta
hoga?” etc are being mechanically touted by important persons in the Government
as happens after every such incident.
The self-sacrifice of these CRPF
jawans will soon be overtaken by some other incident in the news cycle and they
will be forgotten till the next such incident again forces our collective
conscience to do similar drumbeating.
It is beyond contest that the
leadership, the troops on ground, policy-makers, police and everyone else
joined together to create this tragedy of errors and they were guilty of
criminal negligence leading to loss of precious lives of trained soldiers.
Worst part is that CRPF in particular and policy makers and others responsible
for controlling the situation refuse to learn from past mistakes and such
tragic loss of life keeps recurring with alarming regularity.
It is high time that those responsible
for the humungous failure are taken to task and sacked for their incompetence.
Let that be a lesson for future occupants of powerful positions that they are
there to perform and not to procrastinate and pass the buck.
Many questions arise: First, Why did
they keep sleeping on the request of IG CRPF of Kashmir to provide aircraft for
the troops stranded at Jammu due to closure of the National Highway? It is
typical of the decision makers confined to the comfort of Delhi to not be able
to relate to the problems of field. Why could they not visualise the problems
that the troops stranded at Jammu would be facing at transit camps in Jammu and
Srinagar? What stopped them from permitting air travel for them from Srinagar
to Jammu and vice versa temporarily to prevent overcrowding at these camps, for
which provisions exist to the best of my memory? What kind of leaders are they
who can’t act proactively to alleviate hardships to the under command and
expose them to such grave security risks?
Second is the failure of intelligence.
A wireless signal dated February 8 is being touted as proof of intelligence of
likely incident being shared with CRPF. But that is a general signal address to
everyone in the valley to be cautious against IEDs. This is no intelligence.
Perhaps intelligence agencies could do a better job by being more specific.
Unfortunately, the intelligence
agencies have started treating basic information as intelligence. They appear
to have forgotten the art of collating and analysing information being received
from different sources.
Moot question is that if immediately
after the incident they have been able to know that 350 kg of explosive was
used in the incident and if they have been able to get hold of the video of
suicide bomber immediately, why could they not develop the intelligence prior
to the incident?
Assembly of such large quantity of
explosive, purchase of the vehicle, planning for the operation would have taken
a lot of time and would have left footprints for our intelligence personnel to
identify. There would have been many communications between the suicide bomber
and his handler. Why could these not be intercepted?
Third is the operational failure of
the “Road Opening Party” (ROP) and those responsible for supervising its
function. It is not clear whether the vehicle used by the suicide bomber came
from the same direction or other. If it came from the same direction, how was
it allowed to overtake several vehicles of the convoy and ram into its target?
Initial report had suggested that the
vehicle was travelling from opposite direction on wrong side of the one-way
road. The reports had also suggested that the vehicle was stationary at the
road for a few minutes before the convoy reached there. How was that it did not
attract any suspicion from ROP?
The initial reports quoting a CRPF
Inspector General of CRPF also had suggested that the explosion was accompanied
by firing. If true, it is even bigger failure on part of ROP. This implies that
the troops were not dominating the road effectively, task of ROP being to
ensure that the road is clear of any threats including threat from small arms
fire.
The incident also speaks poorly of the
officers responsible to supervise function of the ROP. Had he been doing his
duty properly, he would have ensured alertness of ROP and perhaps there was,
even if remote chance of preventing the tragedy.
The tragedy also reflects poorly on
the standards of training of the troops deployed for ROP. In fact, the training
in Central Paramilitary forces has been a casualty for long. Continuous
deployment, absence of any reserves including the training Companies and heavy
intake of troops in recent past has played havoc with the training systems. Not
the least, the IPS leadership assigns no priority to training.
The Prime Minister spoke of giving a
free hand to the forces but then why did it have to be this massive tragedy for
him to realise the seriousness of the situation in Kashmir? Why were the forces
made to operate with their hand tied behind their back? Everyone knows that
South Kashmir is the hotbed of militancy, then what prevented forces from
operating proactively in these areas?
Even if it is conceded that the
previous government in J&K was somewhat sympathetic to militants, they are
no longer there. It is the Governor’s rule in Kashmir for a few months now, yet
the operations did not commence!
The cacophony of voices both official
and unofficial blaming Pakistan for the tragedy and illusion that the militants
have carried out this operation in “hatasha” or despair smacks of immature
understanding of the situation.
While role of Pakistan in fomenting
trouble there is beyond doubt, it cannot be said that it is the only reason.
Pakistan is exploiting the weaknesses of India’s Kashmir policy to the hilt. We
need to urgently address our policies on Kashmir.
Further, militants don’t operate out
of “hatasha”. They operate whenever they find that the forces have let down
their guard. They attack forces at their weakest point after meticulous
planning and preparation. The forces therefore cannot afford to let their guard
down even for a moment and it is for the commanders to ensure that through
adequate training and continuous supervision.
Last but not the least, the
paramilitary forces soldiers have to be given their due. Treating them as
second class soldier by treating them as civilian employees, depriving them of
their pension, and other benefits besides not equipping them with proper
equipment like the bullet proof vehicles and jackets etc. seriously compromises
their efficiency and morale. This must change.
It is my earnest hope that at-least
now the authorities concerned will learn their lessons.
(IPA Service)
Courtesy: The
Leaflet
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